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Pursuing the Perpetual Conflict
Ethnographic Reflections on the Persistent Role 
of the “Terrorist Threat” in Contemporary Peru 
Martha-cecilia dietrich
The question of how to remember twenty years of insurgency and state violence 
during the internal armed conflict (1980–2000) continues to polarize the social 
and political landscape of Peru. Dominant narratives of victims and perpetrators 
effectively silence more ambiguous and complicated memories. In this article I 
examine memories of the conflict that have been relegated to the margins of public 
discourse. Memories that tell stories of victims as perpetrators and perpetrators as 
victims are “placeless” because they upset a post-conflict order that is constituted 
by a form of civil contract through which mutual opponents coexist with each other 
without having to confront a conflicted past. I argue that in order to maintain a 
status quo, polarization is not merely a byproduct but a condition.
Keywords: Social memory; perpetual conflict; anthropology of culpability; post-
conflict Peru
In [the] future, all violence will reveal what Christ’s Passion 
revealed, the foolish genesis of bloodstained idols and the false 
gods of religion, politics, and ideologies. The murderers remain 
convinced of the worthiness of their sacrifices. 
René Girard, The Scapegoat, 212
Since the end of the Peruvian internal armed conflict (1980–2000), human 
rights activists and leftist politicians have sought to distance themselves 
from acts of politically motivated violence committed in the name of 
radical left-wing ideologies. In the early 1980s two insurgent groups 
declared war against the Peruvian state: the Sendero Luminoso, Shining 
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Path, the Maoist inspired Communist Party of Peru (PCP-SL), and the 
Soviet-inspired socialist Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA). 
What was known as the Peruvian terrorist threat ended with the capture 
and imprisonment of the insurgents’ leaders and an almost complete dis-
mantling of the country’s democratic institutions by the government of 
the then President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000). However, after almost 
two decades of transitional justice, memory activism and human rights 
movements, today’s public debates about terrorism still seem more con-
cerned with fabricating images of inherently evil perpetrators rather than 
trying to understand the roots of politically motivated violence. Superficial 
discussions in the media on how to understand terrorism tend to favor a 
view that isolates the culprit or group from a broader social environment 
and situates the terrorist outside of any social experience that may have 
contributed to his/her radicalization. This common perspective inevitably 
absolves the society in which terrorism occurs. In the past two decades 
prevailing perspectives on terrorism have been critically discussed by a 
number of scholars of Peru, both inside and outside the country.1 In times 
of “fake news” and the development of various radicalisms in Europe and 
the United States, there is much to learn from Peru and how its society 
and politics have responded to terrorism and its aftermath.2 The question 
I raise in this article is twofold: what are the dominant memory narratives 
and how do they contribute to establishing a post-conflict order? Draw-
ing on my long-term study of discourses of violence and my work with 
political prisoners and victims’ organizations in Peru, I will discuss the 
mechanisms by which violent groups or individuals are constructed by 
public discourse and how they affect former actors of the conflict. First, 
I introduce my collaborators Ana and Cristina, whose stories have been 
the basis for my ethnography.3 Then, I provide a short historical contex-
tualization of the conflict in order to facilitate a subsequent discussion of 
the contemporary state of memory discourses in Peru. Fundamentally, I 
am interested in how intended polarizations impact the emotional and 
experiential worlds of former actors in the conflict and how newly estab-
lished areas of silence—now more than ever— may impede post-conflict 
societies from coming to terms with a violent past.
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OF WHAT USE IS OUR VOICE IF NOBODY WANTS TO LISTEN?
Since the early 1990s, when both insurgent groups were still active, 
Peruvian right-wing politicians and media have seized upon people’s fear 
of terrorism, a strategy that until today has helped populist parties to win 
elections. Even though both insurgent groups have declared the end of 
their armed struggle, the creation of “the terrorist” as the modern scape-
goat has succeeded in Peru and is alive and well today.4 Some insurgents 
who have not been killed or imprisoned or have not resigned from their 
militant organization have chosen a life as drug traffickers in the Amazon 
rainforest. Occasionally there are reports of military interventions or 
armed confrontations with Shining Path in central and southern rainfor-
est regions. Even though the name is a reminder of the insurgent group 
that was active in the 1980s and 1990s, there seems to be little left of any 
political ambition. History books have declared the terrorist groups as 
the sole perpetrators of the Peruvian armed conflict. Books, movies and 
the media portray its members as social outcasts, furious, promiscuous, 
blood- and revenge-thirsty.5 Despite the fact that terrorism has ceased to 
be a priority of state affairs, it continues to haunt contemporary politics, 
not only during elections but also in debates about national security, 
citizens’ rights and education. 
A saying goes that people do not listen with the intention of under-
standing, but with the intention of replying. Whether the speaking out or 
speaking up by victims or perpetrators of a conflict is productive depends 
on a public that all too often expects to hear categorical assumptions and 
common scripts. The higher the level of polarization in public debate, the 
simpler the narratives, the binary oppositions and the images that portray 
people. In a conversation with a former insurgent I was told: “What’s the 
point of ambiguous stories if no one is interested in the truth?”
Activists, scholars and artists working in the aftermath of violent 
conflicts have often sought to tell the stories of “the unheard,” those 
who are rendered vulnerable. The act of “giving voice” to people without 
agency seeks to point out and defy unequal relationships of power, but all 
too often it has the effect of reinforcing them.6 Nonetheless, the attempt 
to articulate someone else’s experiences reveals a certain politics of tell-
ing, listening and being heard.7 To understand the often-subtle layers of 
negotiating voice and the practice of voicing in post-conflict settings, the 
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researcher is presented with the difficult task of reaching beyond polariza-
tions. Social anthropologist Antonius Robben speaks of “ethnographic 
seduction” when referring to the interviewee’s manifold ways of influenc-
ing the interviewer’s understandings and research results.8 He argues that 
narratives, in all cases, are fragments of experience as remembered, which 
are made to fit certain framings of the past. Ambiguity is more likely to 
be found in fragments that are cut out from people’s narratives precisely 
because they challenge boundaries that delineate what can be told and 
what not. Discussing migrant stories as told by asylum seekers and refugees 
in Ireland, Darcy Alexandra reminds us that stories are not created in or 
for isolation. Rather, they are the result of the narrator’s understanding 
of her own situation and position in relation to a specific environment.9 
Alexandra argues that storytelling, particularly in contexts of forced or 
illegal migration, occupies an important social role because it allows an 
increase in narrative rapport, building understanding, for example, between 
migrants and the general public.10 In my project, in which I worked with 
perpetrators and relatives of victims of the Peruvian armed conflict, the 
intention was to co-create filmic narratives of the past that would allow for 
an engaged inquiry into the experience of memory and memory regimes in 
post-conflict Peru. In this sense, the research aimed to analyze the politics 
and poetics that shape practices of fragmenting, framing and constructing 
memory through storytelling.
The stories of Ana and Cristina could not be more different. Nar-
rating memory in both cases presented practical, conceptual and political 
limitations to telling their stories. Ana is a former guerrilla fighter who was 
sentenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment. Originally from an urban 
middle-class background, she studied at a national university, where, in her 
own words, she “became politicized.” Eager to change the future of her 
country, she decided to become a revolutionary. In the early 1980s, she 
was on a mission when a squad of special agents arrested her. For about 
two weeks she disappeared in the dungeons of the anti-terrorist police 
force (DINOCTE), where she was interrogated and tortured before being 
transferred to a public prison. She has told her story a thousand times in 
poems and letters, at court hearings and to journalists, researchers, artists 
and students of all sides and fields. “I have learned how to tell my story,” 
she told me at the beginning of our collaboration. Cristina is one of the 
earliest members of ANFASEP, the oldest victims’ organization in the 
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country.11 She is known for her sacrifice and perseverance in providing 
support and guidance to relatives of the disappeared. Before the conflict, 
she lived a humble existence as a farmer in Ayacucho with her husband 
and eight children. She herself lost a son during the conflict. In 1983 a 
squad of soldiers took him from their family home in the middle of the 
night, an act that changed her life forever. Since then, she has not once 
refused to give an interview, hoping to reach those who have the capacity 
to help find the dead and bring justice to their cause. Armed with a ban-
ner and cross she still walks the streets of Lima and Ayacucho in protest. 
Her story of courage has been told in films, museums, books and articles. 
Many elements contributed to how Ana’s and Cristina’s stories were 
told in our collaboration, including institutional politics, discrepancies 
between victims’ groups, the context of a maximum-security prison and 
the degree to which people, places and language were politically charged. 
Our priority was their safety, which is why we increasingly saw the neces-
sity for research methods that would ensure that their names, identities 
and personal histories would remain concealed.
At different points in our collaboration, Ana and Cristina shared 
other sides of their stories with me. As actors in the conflict, they are 
seen as being opposed to each other—one the terrorist, the other the 
victim—but they both represent emblematic figures. Ana, the insurgent 
woman, is painted in popular narratives as a mad, promiscuous and ruth-
less killer. The figure of the female terrorist is considered to have worse 
personality traits than her male counterparts, underlining the dimensions 
in which post-conflict identities are gendered identities that incorporate 
assumptions about the social role of men and women in a society termed 
“machista.”12 In an interview I conducted with Peruvian congresswoman 
Luisa Maria “Lucha” Cuculiza of the Fuerza Popular Party, she described 
the profile of the insurgent woman as follows:
She is Machiavellian. She is the one who gives the coup de grâce, 
who is in charge of persecutions and of conducting attacks. It’s 
incredible, but the female terrorist is beyond what I would call a 
normal human being. I believe they go through a transformation 
to become hyenas—this evilness, this insanity.… In the depths of 
their soul, their being and their consciousness they should know that 
being a woman means to protect life, to show their children to be 
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good men. How is it possible that the soul of a woman is a terrorist? 
It doesn’t make any sense to me.13 
The narrative works through othering, by means of which the ter-
rorist woman becomes “not us” and thus endangers what is ours.14 The 
criminalization of the other further elevates the “us.” On the other side, 
there is Cristina and her fellow relatives at ANFASEP, who have been 
portrayed as the ultimate innocent victims or “victimas puras” (pure 
victims), as she once stated herself. Affectionately, they are referred to 
as “mamas,” signifying the mother who looks for the human remains of 
her son, marching the streets peacefully. Her words and images conjure a 
selfless, persevering, compassionate and determined mother, even though 
she increasingly feels she has had enough. Comparing Ana’s descriptions 
with Cristina’s, it becomes apparent how emotions such as pain, hate, 
fear, disgust, shame and love, or more importantly, the ability to control 
emotions, are bound up with securing social hierarchy. In this sense, 
“emotionality as a claim about a subject or collective is clearly dependent 
on relations of power, which endows others with meaning and value.”15
Cristina describes the symbolic meaning of her portrayal as enabling, 
but also limiting, the sharing, claiming or negotiating of ANFASEP’s 
demands. Many of the depictions of Cristina resemble the image of the 
Virgin Mary, who confronts injustice with faith. As such, she and her fellow 
mamas have been turned into the symbols of a human rights and victims’ 
movement. “This is how demands for truth, justice and memory can be 
made in Catholic Peru,” she once confided. But Ana and Cristina also 
have stories they cannot tell, because they have much to lose in a world 
where polarizing oppositions have become the norm. These are stories of 
guilt, conscious choices and unwanted outcomes. In my research, I have 
been most concerned with those memories that cannot always be articu-
lated, making them “placeless” in the space of public discourse. Paying 
attention to these impossible-to-tell stories may not only enable a broader 
understanding of the forces operating behind the making of history and 
memory but may also reveal the existential grounds on which people have 
built identities in post-conflict Peru. I argue that the placelessness of such 
memories has furthered violent discourses and politically informed practices 
of “un-listening,” rather than broadened our understanding of violence.
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FRAMING A CONFLICT
At the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, after twelve years of mili-
tary rule, Peru experienced a phase of a new “democratic awakening.” 
During the transition period from a military to a civil government, Peru’s 
political landscape was roiled by serious tensions. According to Alberto 
Gálvez Olaechea, a former member of the MRTA, la nueva izquierda 
(the new left) was convinced that every revolution started with an armed 
uprising. A revolution is what the country needed in order to break with 
the “old ways” of Peruvian politics. Olaechea writes, “everything had to 
be redefined and discussed: new ways of how to actually do politics in a 
democracy, or defining what a Peruvian left actually meant.”16 The growth 
of new guerrilla movements on the continent and recognition of Peru’s 
deep-rooted social inequalities inspired the emergence of radical factions 
of left-wing parties, which later morphed into what we now know as the 
PCP-SL and the MRTA.
In 1980, the Shining Path declared its so-called people’s war against 
the Peruvian state. Based in Ayacucho and with the initial support of 
large factions of society, mainly from the Andean highlands, the Shining 
Path considered the state an enemy of the people which needed to be 
annihilated in order to free the space for a new order.17 With the support 
of provincial teachers’ unions, the Shining Path gained access to rural 
communities, where, in escuelas populares (people’s schools) they led 
campaigns to educate peasants. Rural communities were educated in the 
Shining Path’s ideology, which they referred to as “Gonzalo Thought,”18 
harnessing people’s sense of dissatisfaction and social injustice in the 
country’s poorest regions, whilst keeping its distance from other left-wing 
or communist groups.19
Four years after the Shining Path’s declaration of war in 1984, the 
MRTA, an urban guerrilla group, also initiated an armed struggle, so that 
there were now two insurgent groups aiming to overthrow the country’s 
political elite. As opposed to the Shining Path, the MRTA identified 
with the existing nation-state but saw a need for substantial changes to 
it. Socialist liberation and national equality were seen as the ideological-
political solutions for a democracy permeated by social fragmentation, 
political repression and persecution.20 Their symbolic appropriation of the 
Peruvian flag and adoption of a new national anthem signified this antago-
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nistic relationship to the nation-state.21 Political violence was considered 
a tool for advancing a global anti-imperialist project, working alongside 
revolutionary governments like Cuba and other militant movements in the 
region such as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria in Chile and 
the M-19 movement in Colombia to which they had close ties. Despite 
fundamental differences between the two insurgent groups—encompassing 
political vision, military strategy, ideology, etc.—politicians and mainstream 
media have made no effort to distinguish between them, and today the 
two organizations are remembered as mere terrorist groups. However, 
there is a great deal to be learned from the diversity of political organiza-
tions of that time and the ways those groups have, in their own manner, 
shaped today’s political landscape.
During the twenty years of the Peruvian internal armed conflict, 
three different presidents responded to the insurgents by sending the 
armed forces, the police and clandestine paramilitary units to conduct a 
brutal counterinsurgency campaign that lasted until 2000, when Alberto 
Fujimori’s increasingly authoritarian government eventually fell.22 With 
around 70,000 people killed and almost a half-million people forced 
to leave their homes, the internationally acclaimed Peruvian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) declared this conflict the longest and 
most costly conflict in terms of human casualties, forced migration and 
material losses since the foundation of the republic in 1822.23 The TRC 
further found that the state forces were responsible for 37 percent of the 
conflict’s fatalities, as well as systematic human rights violations, including 
torture, forced disappearances, sexual violence, and vandalism. While the 
MRTA was found responsible for 1.8 percent of inflicted deaths during 
the conflict, the majority—54 percent—was ascribed to the Shining Path. 
As investigations have shown, violence was unleashed in unprecedented 
ways when the Shining Path lost control over its territories.24 Its repres-
sion of and punishments against civilians, public executions of alleged 
traitors and the systematic destruction of key infrastructure turned the 
population, mainly peasants who had initially supported Shining Path’s 
call for a revolution, against them. Civilians organized into self-defense 
committees that collaborated with the Peruvian military and ultimately 
led to the collapse of the Shining Path.
The unprecedented use of violence by an insurgent group is how the 
Peruvian conflict differs significantly from other conflicts in the region. 
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For instance, in Chile and Argentina the military dictatorships of the time 
were considered the main, if not exclusive, culprits in inflicting violence 
and death. In the Peruvian case, categories of victims and perpetrators 
could not clearly and exclusively be allocated to a specific group. In this 
sense, making and taking sides has been particularly challenging for those 
concerned with establishing truth and justice in a way that serves what 
the TRC has called a “national reconciliation.”25 For understanding the 
Peruvian case it may be useful to abstain from defining categories such as 
victims and perpetrators. Like in many other contexts of war and conflict, 
their memories often carry uncomfortable, dangerous and silenced truths. 
They are memories that are based on lived experiences and therefore not 
easily brushed away by those who own them. The brutality has been 
mainly attributed to the Shining Path, and the effect of this on public 
discourses, particularly in Lima, has been to obscure and even legitimize 
the violence inflicted by agents of the state. In this context, an analysis 
of the social production of guilt becomes all the more relevant, not least 
because legitimacy in Peru is produced over opposing narratives. The 
tragedy lies in the ways the complexities of the conflict were reduced to 
simplified and polarized depictions of the past, often favoring the army 
and governments of the time, while demonizing the insurgents and the 
people of Ayacucho, who wanted social change.
In March 2018 ANFASEP’s Museum of Memory in Ayacucho came 
under investigation by the prosecutor’s office. In early October 2017 
Congressman Octavio Salazar, a member of the Fuerza Popular party that 
was formerly led by incarcerated ex-president Alberto Fujimori, accused 
the museum of misrepresenting the state forces as perpetrators and thus 
glorifying terrorism and the atrocities committed by the Shining Path.26 
Indeed, the museum contains a reproduction of a torture cell, commonly 
installed at police stations or military barracks; according to the women 
from ANFASEP, however, the point of this display is to show the dif-
ferent kinds of violence inflicted by both the Shining Path and the state 
forces. Juana Carrion Jaulis, president of ANFASEP and one of my main 
informants during fieldwork, told me over the phone, “See, once more 
we have to defend our disappeared relatives, our organization, and our 
history as we know it.”27
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MEMORIES WITHOUT PLACE
The stories told by former insurgents, which I collected over the past six 
years, carry a strong sense of injustice about the writing of an official history 
of the conflict. According to them, publicly sharing their experiences is a 
way to contest imposed silences that reproduce and secure a hegemonic 
truth and memory of the conflict. Voices and perspectives of former insur-
gents are absent from publicly accessible spaces of memory, constituting 
an exclusion from official histories in-the-making. The most prominent 
example is the Lugar de la Memoria (Place of Memory), a museum of 
memory in Lima that opened its doors in early 2015. Its permanent exhibi-
tion is based on several months (October 2013–February 2014) of careful 
research conducted by a team of curators on the kinds of memories to be 
narrated through text, images and video, and, more importantly, on who 
should narrate them.28 Because of ongoing contestations in the news and 
internal disputes about who should be given what space in this environ-
ment, an exhibition script (guion museográfico) was elaborated, which was 
then taken for consultation to different groups of former actors around 
the country.29 The groups included “affected civilians,” “those affected 
by the armed forces and police,” “journalists,” “artists,” “human rights 
activists,” “members of the state forces and police” and “authorities.” 
These groups were invited to discuss a set of topics ranging from media 
coverage; the role of women, the community and perpetrators; and the 
“memorialization” of experiences. According to the authors, this participa-
tory process was necessary in order to elicit what they refer to as “difficult 
knowledge” or “uncomfortable memories” that not only facilitate “the 
knowledge of an official past … but also serve the purpose of education 
and prevention on a national and international level.”30 At no point were 
former insurgents involved in the process despite the TRC’s finding that 
the boundary separating victims from perpetrators was, in the Peruvian 
case, blurred and that responsibilities for inflicting violence on civil society 
had to be assumed by the insurgent groups as well as by the state and state 
forces. However, according to one of the curators the inclusion of former 
insurgents in developing the script would have been categorically rejected 
by the political authorities. The exhibition includes one testimonial of a 
former member of the Shining Path, who shows repentance by attributing 
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her error and confusion to her young age, a lack of perspective in life and 
the power of Shining Path’s leadership to persuade people.
Despite attempts to consolidate a single narrative of the conflict, 
competing narratives continue to crop up in art, literature, film and (social) 
media platforms, which suggests the great extent to which memories of the 
armed conflict are actually part of the country’s sociopolitical present. In 
this context, memory—as the public articulation of collective pasts—has 
turned into something reserved for certain actors only. And not only insur-
gents share this opinion. One of my informants, Pepe Garrido, a military 
general during the conflict, described memory as a right that had been 
“hijacked” by human rights activists. Indeed, the concept of the “right 
to remembrance” has been associated with human rights movements at a 
time when authoritarian discourses that favored oblivion have dominated 
civil society.31 With the notion of the “right to remembrance,” human 
rights activists appealed to the constitutional state to reconstruct a past 
that would bring justice to the victims of the conflict. Memory in this sense 
serves as a means for justice and for bringing about social healing. But 
what happens when lived experiences contradict narratives that substantiate 
legitimate claims and demands for justice? I want to turn to discussing two 
stories from my collaborators, who have become friends over the years. 
Their stories are considered “untellable” and yet they occupy their lives. 
According to Ana and Cristina, the experiences of violence and conflict 
are full of particular stories, stories of the impossibility of telling them.
Ana
In 2011 I invited activists of the victims’ organization ANFASEP, a group 
of female insurgents currently in prison and former members of the armed 
forces, to participate in making a documentary film. The purpose of the 
film was to look closely at their ways of remembering the armed conflict 
to make tangible their notions of this contested past. The film, Entre 
Memorias (Between Memories), was released in 2015 (see figure 1).32 
For three months we worked on the four-page-long voice-over in 
which Ana would narrate her upbringing, her radicalization at university, 
her life as an insurgent of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, 
and her capture and imprisonment. After the police arrested her in 1992, 
she was physically and sexually abused. She suffered several rounds of 
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interrogation under torture and was isolated for several months in solitary 
confinement, and, as it was for many others, this was an experience from 
which she never fully recovered. To this day, she suffers from migraine 
headaches, a sleep disorder, panic attacks and other psychiatric problems. 
National courts have never taken up her demands for justice, even though 
her case was supported by several human rights organizations in the country.
When we started our film project, she explained that she had nothing 
to lose and therefore did not shy away from taking responsibility for her 
actions as an insurgent and sharing her thoughts on the role of memory 
after the conflict. She participated in insurgent activities in the 1990s and 
Fig. 1. Poster of Entre Memorias created by Lisa Ifsits. Photo by Martha-
Cecilia Dietrich 2015.
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even though she was not directly involved in any killings, she helped in 
planning and organizing subversive actions with casualties. She was sen-
tenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment. When we first met in April 
2012 she had already spent nineteen years in prison and had no confidence 
in ever leaving the female maximum-security prison in Chorrillos because, 
according to her, politicians remain reluctant to release “terrorists” in 
fear of the possible political backlash. At the time of writing it is October 
2018, and she still remains in prison.
A few days before the completion of our first phase of work, in June 
2012, Ana received news that the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights had forwarded her case to the court of that same institution. This 
was wonderful news, as new opportunities for parole could open up, 
potentially meaning an end to imprisonment and perhaps even repara-
tion payments for the abuse suffered after her capture. After receiving this 
news, things changed for Ana. With a tone of irony, she said to me that to 
find real justice she now had to become a victim: “I have to be innocent; 
I cannot be guilty, not even a bit. People don’t want to hear anything 
else, and I want to get out and stay out of prison for good. I want to start 
a life.” Because she did not want to disappoint me given the work we 
had done until that point, she proposed to write a new voice-over text, 
but this time focusing on her experiences of torture and maltreatment 
in prison. After a meeting with her lawyer to discuss her new text, not 
much was left of her original story. Her text had been reduced from four 
to one-and-a-half pages and the content had been partially rewritten to 
suit the victim narrative (figure 2). We discussed what it would mean to 
change her story in this way. The story of a confident, righteous, defiant 
and angry woman who went through a time of critical reflection in prison 
had turned into the story of an innocent victim: a girl manipulated into 
following a misguided ideology. 
Her original story started with a young woman who, at the age of 
seventeen, received a scholarship that would allow her to travel to the 
former Soviet Union and discover what socialism really meant. At the 
time, she felt she was part of a global revolution. Ana was no exception; 
she was one among hundreds of Latin American women and men who 
were drawn to the revolutionary ideas of an internationalist socialism. 
She was eager to learn how to apply these ideas and systems to her own 
country, adapting them to Peru’s specific realities and needs. The demo-
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cratic process of the early 1980s became more and more frustrating, and 
this lack of satisfaction turned many people, particularly those of younger 
generations, to join struggles that aimed to take power by force. Stories 
like that of Ana hardly exist in public discourses, not least because they 
challenge established and protected narratives of the Peruvian “terrorist 
threat.” Her story, like the stories of many others, opposes the depiction 
of insurgency as the embodiment of violence and instead offers a layered 
account of what motivated so many young intellectuals to join insurgency, 
an account that may even inspire understanding.
Fig. 2. Ana’s corrected voice-over text. Photograph by Martha-Cecilia Dietrich 2015.
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Ana’s choice to change her story led to our mutual decision to end 
our collaboration, and all I was left with was the story of why her story 
could not be told.
Cristina
Cristina is the mother of one of the 15,000 people estimated to have been 
disappeared by the Peruvian armed forces in the early 1980s. As a member 
of ANFASEP, she regularly participates in demonstrations in Lima and 
Ayacucho, demanding justice alongside her fellow mamas. Thirty years 
ago, there were hundreds of women protesting on the streets, but every 
year more and more die of old age and broken hearts, says María Elena 
Tarqui Palomino, who works in ANFASEP’s own Museum of Memory 
in Ayacucho. María Elena experienced the conflict as a young girl and has 
a disappeared brother, whom she saw for the last time in the summer of 
1983. To members of ANFASEP, justice means the political recognition 
of the people who were abducted, tortured, (extrajudicially) killed and 
disappeared during the conflict. The organization demands the acknowl-
edgment that the state was at least in part and knowingly responsible for 
their suffering. Beyond the symbolic aspect of this recognition, relatives 
would become entitled to claim collective and individual reparations from 
the state. After more than three decades of continuous protests ANFASEP 
is still demanding a more intensive search for the disappeared. According 
to José Pablo Baraybar, the director of EPAF, Peru’s non-governmental 
organization of forensic anthropologists, there are still 4,600 registered 
mass graves that are awaiting exhumation. Further, ANFASEP is asking 
for justice in the writing of history since people from Ayacucho are still 
stigmatized as terrucos (terrorists). In Lima and other places this stereotype 
has closed doors to the labor market and to higher education.33
Mama Cristina does not tire of telling the story of the disappearance 
of her son, who she claims to be an “innocent victim.” One night, army 
soldiers came to their house to pick him up and she never saw him again. 
She went to the local military base almost every day, as they had told her 
this was the place to which all prisoners would be taken. The soldiers at the 
gate however kept denying that he had ever been there. Cristina’s desire, 
like that of many other relatives, is to find her son and give him a Christian 
burial. Then, she says, she would like to stay alive a little longer so she 
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can visit his grave, decorate it with flowers and leave traditional offerings 
such as coca leaves, cigarettes and wawas (sweet bread) on the day of the 
dead. She has often spoken in the media and has written her personal story, 
which, along with those of other mamas, was later published in a book.34
What Cristina does not speak of is the fate of two of her other chil-
dren: her missing son had a twin brother, and he and her eldest daughter 
were members of the Shining Path. They were both killed, presumably by 
members of the armed forces. They were victims too, but not innocent. 
She lost not one but three of her eight children to the war. Only some 
neighbors and old friends know about the other two. In her neighborhood, 
Cristina is not the only one with such a story and sometimes, when there 
are quarrels in the family or among neighbors, these stories are deployed 
to blame or offend the other side. Cristina has seen betrayal and people 
profiting from other people’s suffering, which is why she keeps this story 
to herself. It is private, she says; it has no place at ANFASEP or in any 
courtroom, museum or school book. She almost seems to agree that she 
has no right to mourn the death of her other children, at least not publicly. 
She cannot search for their bodies, because it might keep her from finding 
her innocent boy, and the last thirty years of her struggle for ANFASEP 
would have been for nothing. “If there is any justice at all, it is only for 
innocent victims,” she once confided. Nevertheless, every night before 
she goes to bed, she lights not one but three candles.
Research in the aftermath of war and conflict has been described 
as contested and emotionally charged.35 How to respond to the differ-
ences and discrepancies between experiences as narrated and experiences 
as lived? The anthropologist Michael Jackson suggests that the analysis 
of stories—as they are told—is a way to reach an understanding of what 
constitutes human experience, because like memory, stories highlight some 
and cloud other aspects of an experience. He writes: “[stories] reconcile 
fields of experience that are, on the one hand, felt to belong to us, or our 
own kind and, on the other, felt to be shared or belong to others. Yet, 
stories may just as trenchantly exaggerate differences, foment discord, and 
do violence to lived experience.”36 In this sense, stories are not only for 
their tellers alone but also for negotiating the space in between expres-
sion and perception. The act of storytelling is therefore many things at 
once: a means of protection and/or a means of living one’s own illusions.37 
Through the performative practice of storytelling, one seeks confirmation 
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for one’s own existence, however problematic this existence may be. If we 
understand storytelling as an existential practice, the stories of Ana and 
Cristina are an indication of the importance of making sense of one’s own 
being-in-a-world-after-violence. Sense is found in the necessity to come 
to terms with this past, which enables justice and practices of closure. But 
the struggle for legitimacy and public acknowledgement is competitive 
and under continuous contestation in courtrooms, schools, museums, 
the media and the streets.
The social anthropologist Nandini Sundar suggested that the study 
of discourses that aim to make sense of violent pasts should consider how 
culpability is constructed in the aftermath of violent events.38 With an 
“anthropology of culpability,” she proposes to look at social processes, 
mechanisms and practices that situate culpability—meaning the definition 
and allocation of guilt—in a larger moral framework. By doing so, the 
questions to be asked shift from who is to blame and why to how people 
become moral culprits for acts of violence that they committed or were 
committed in their name. At the same time, the aim is to explore the power 
relationships in the attribution and circulation of culpability that, so she 
argues, “influence the ways in which hierarchies of guilt and the guilty are 
established.”39 Based on a variety of examples including the US “War on 
Terror” and the response of mainstream media, but also numerous truth 
and reconciliation commissions, war crime tribunals and public statements 
of perpetrators around the world, Sundar argues that the establishment 
of an official type of guilt is often used to consolidate new hierarchies and 
cover up “guilt” in and for the present.40 The stories of Ana and Cristina 
make tangible the mechanism through which memories can exist beyond 
discursive surfaces. However, it is these surfaces, defined by moral norms 
and social order, that not only create the texture of spaces in which sto-
ries can or cannot be shared but also invite inquiry into the impact these 
moral(izing) memory regimes have on those who live them.
MORAL PASTS
Patterns of social processes in which individuals and groups are ousted have 
been analyzed by Erving Goffman and René Girard. Goffman discusses 
the practice of actively exposing what is “unusual and bad about the moral 
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status of the signifier,” which he traces back to the Greeks, who called these 
signs of disgrace “stigma.”41 Stigmata mark their carriers as blemished or 
polluted persons who are to be publicly avoided. Girard focuses less on 
the alienating agent as something that is given or owned, and more on 
the social mechanisms that shape the process of scapegoating. He argues 
that the creation of the scapegoat “always relates to collective persecutions 
that gives birth to religious illusions.”42 What Girard refers to as illusions 
may be translated into what is meant by the “greater good.” It establishes 
a certain order in which hierarchies and relationships of power can be 
asserted, but only against a common threat. Examples of scapegoated 
groups and individuals are manifold, whether religious or political groups, 
racial or ethnic minorities, class- or gender-related groups, and so forth. 
A sense of being and/or belonging may be conceived of as a threat, but 
also the opposite: not wanting to belong to a dominant group may have 
similar effects. Albert Camus once commented on the hero of his 1942 
book The Stranger, saying that “those who refuse to play the game, are 
condemned.”43 Camus underlines the social consequences of resistance 
to canons that call for the implementation of exclusive moral norms and 
orders. In this sense, (moral) otherness is created to instill a sense of threat.
According to Didier Fassin there has been a general reluctance within 
the discipline of social anthropology to investigate moral engagements.44 
The reasons for this deep-rooted discomfort, he argues, are historical as well 
as epistemological. On the one hand, anthropologists have long struggled 
to overcome the discipline’s colonial legacy and to renounce the practice 
of providing scientific answers to political problems or agendas. On the 
other hand, modern anthropology since Franz Boas, is spurred by ideas of 
cultural relativism where the researcher’s job is to offer a sense of a social 
reality that is legitimated by its situated-ness. However, speaking about 
people’s values and the motivations underlying their moral engagements 
generates a certain discomfort not only because there is a risk of falling 
into a somewhat moralist or moralizing rhetoric but also because questions 
posed to the researched may as easily be turned toward the researcher. 
Anthropologists who have thought about an analysis of moral engagements 
seem to plead either for disciplinary objectivity or for a commitment to 
their ethical responsibilities.45 Fassin’s claim, not for “moral sentiments” 
but for a “science of morals,” maintains that beyond an evaluation of 
what is considered good and evil, there is a certain obligation to inquire 
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into “the human belief in the possibility of telling right from wrong and 
in the necessity of acting in favour of the good and against the evil.”46 
Looking at the construction of moral selves and others in the aftermath of 
war and conflict, we might ask: how do social agents distinguish between 
manufactured dichotomies, where discrepancies between what is said and 
what actually is are inevitable.
Seventeen years after the end of the armed conflict, there are still 
intense debates on what, who and how Peruvians should remember. Rules 
for evaluating stories, events and people are contested and constantly 
negotiated. If on one end of the spectrum the moral obligation resides in 
defending a status quo, on the other end, it lies in challenging and chang-
ing what is considered immoral. The moralization of practices and people 
defines which deaths can be mourned and which cannot. Some deaths 
are considered national tragedies, while others, like those of terrorists, 
are comprehended as socially beneficial. This means that mourning over 
some deaths is more righteous than mourning over others, a sentiment 
that stems from a shared sense of justice. The main concern however is not 
whether it is right or wrong to think that some deaths can be mourned 
and others cannot, but rather what kind of frameworks created the moral 
legitimacy of mourning. A recent example shows some of the arguments 
used. During the heated public debate that was fought in the media and in 
street protests about granting parole to former president Alberto Fujimori, 
who had been convicted of corruption and crimes against humanity, his 
supporters claimed that, despite his and his government’s unconstitu-
tional actions, he had eradicated terrorism and regained control over the 
country.47 This argument—that violence is a legitimate if not necessary 
means to defend the greater good—justifies civilian casualties, and even 
more so if their status as innocents is unclear. This is how politicians today 
explain the massacres of Barrios Altos (November 3, 1991) and La Cantuta 
(July 18, 1992), where death squads linked directly to Fujimori killed 
civilians who allegedly were members of the Shining Path, but were later 
proclaimed innocent. In debates about the rightfulness of having killed 
suspected insurgents, Fujimori’s supporters fire up familiar narratives: of 
collateral damage (even when innocents are killed, if there is one terrorist 
it is a success), of the stronger force (Fujimori had to show a stern hand in 
order to take back control) and of the exclusive binary oppositions (those 
who are not for us, can only be against us). Those opposing this motion 
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are deemed terrorists, which is how ANFASEP’s Museum of Memory in 
Ayacucho found itself under attack when Congressman Salazar declared 
in an open parliamentary session that the museum was apologetic toward 
terrorism by exposing violence that was inflicted by the state forces.48
Current discourses on memory in Peru, and around the globe, force 
people to adopt radical positions. What is disturbing is not only the current 
popularity of different kinds of radicalisms, but the ways that common 
enemies are so easily created and mystified. Radical extremists are painted 
as seemingly isolated groups situated outside society. However, taking 
insurgency or terrorism out of their sociopolitical context works to absolve 
societies, and the people behind these crimes, from their own histories. 
Being “other-than-us” becomes the main problem. What can be conceived 
of as a social question is turned into a moral question based on a political 
reconfiguration of moral sentiments and values. Conversely, stories that 
humanize perpetrators or even show them as victims carry a specific kind 
of ambiguity that, to the disquiet of those who promote these separations, 
embed perpetrators in, rather than isolate them from, society. It comes as 
no surprise that these stories are unwanted because they demand that not 
only governments and local authorities take responsibility but also that 
they come together with civil society to solve the problem. Uncomfortable 
stories that disrupt the coherence of polarizing narratives are adapted or else 
relegated to the margins of what is considered a morally acceptable truth.
George Orwell’s concept of the perpetual conflict expresses the idea 
that the continuous reproduction of mutual hatred ties together oppos-
ing parties.49 The creation of fixed identities that exist only in relation to 
something or someone other not only reproduces a polarized discursive 
landscape but also limits the expression of diverse memories, experiences 
and narratives. I have found Orwell’s propositions useful to make sense 
of Peru’s current situation and to bring together the historical, social and 
political construction of the country’s most recent armed conflict.
PERPETUAL CONFLICTS: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Previous analyses of societies dealing with political, religious or ethnic 
violence all suggest that social violence has a “before” and an “after,” 
and it continues after the bloodshed ends and peace treaties are signed.50 
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Societies aiming to come to terms with a violent past write official histories 
that are defined by the politics and poetics of memory. Memory narratives 
create heroes and villains, victims and perpetrators, good and evil. In Peru 
these binary divisions are not as clear as they might be in other contexts. 
Even though official versions of the past such as the final report of the TRC 
underline the multiplicity of roles in and responsibilities toward the crimes 
committed, in public discourses insurgents have become the scapegoats of 
history, the common enemy that enables other narratives to exist without 
having to confront personal experiences of a contested past. Splinter groups 
of the Shining Path have withdrawn into the Amazon region, turning to 
drug trafficking for survival, while the main leaders of both the Shining 
Path and the MRTA remain imprisoned. But the myth of the common 
enemy has to be kept alive—to secure an existing civil contract that bonds 
the many by alienating the few—without compromising the appearance 
of being a democratic nation. Recommendations discussed in congress 
and the media over what to do with former terrorists range from lifelong 
imprisonment and forcing them to undergo public exposure and humili-
ation to reintroducing the death penalty.51
Nonetheless, throughout fieldwork I met people who spoke of 
complex realities and ambiguous memories, among insurgents, victims’ 
organizations and members of the armed forces. They spoke of institu-
tional hierarchies, battlefield traumas and the tormenting silences after 
ceasefire. My brief encounters with former soldiers of lower ranks were 
mainly coincidences—a taxi driver in Lima, a shop assistant in Ayacucho, 
a hotel manager in the lowlands of Cusco. One did not reveal his name, 
and the other two made it a condition to not even mention their stories 
in any text or film I would make, not even to underline the impossibility 
of telling their unwanted stories. The taxi driver told me: “Señorita, it’s 
going to be very difficult—you see, I have a family and I don’t want to 
get in trouble. No one is going to tell you la verdad verdadera [the true 
truth]. No one! Who would benefit from it, apart from you, missus?” Not 
too dissimilar from the moments in which Ana and Cristina shared their 
stories, these encounters were accompanied by feelings of discomfort and 
were permeated by defensive arguments. Even though these men’s stories 
did not necessarily contradict institutional narratives, they had the poten-
tial to challenge the seemingly unswerving truth promoted by the army.
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My fieldwork has led me to look at the limitations of storytelling, 
which perhaps say more about the relationships and spaces in which these 
stories are (not) being told, rather than about the people (not) telling 
them. In this context, the practice of storytelling, meaning the articulation 
of personal histories, is a process in which moral values are given narrative 
form. In her book The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt states that 
people tell stories in order to make what is private, public.52 The act of 
storytelling, she argues, cannot be understood in isolation because it is 
defined by the complexity and relationality of human relationships. Jackson 
expands on Arendt’s arguments saying that what is publicly narrated in 
turn also shapes the private sphere.53 In this intersubjective space, where 
interpersonal dynamics and social interactions occur, private turns public 
and vice versa. Further, notions of self and other turn into stories with 
underlying narratives, which are active interventions in the production of 
agency. Under disempowering circumstances, the act of narrating gains 
meaning—as does the act of silencing—because telling stories means claim-
ing ownership over one’s own history. Through telling (and silencing) one 
creates a place in the world. So, while storytelling is a social act in itself, 
it is also the foundation of self. My informants took a certain risk when 
trusting me with stories that they understand as publicly untellable. Still, 
there are reasons why they chose to tell them to me, the social anthro-
pologist, who is nothing more than another storyteller. “El silencio nos 
enferma” (silence sickens us), Cristina once told me. Memory functions 
as a driving force, but it is also toxic in that it may impact the body and 
the mind destructively. 
Confiding one’s burden to someone else produces a sense of closeness 
and trust, and Ana and Cristina hope their stories—though anonymized 
and decontextualized—may speak to other people in similar circum-
stances or at least enable them to discuss the complexity of the conflict. 
But silencing ambiguous memories has also been regarded as productive. 
In his ethnography of village communities in the Andean highlands, the 
historian Ponciano Del Pino describes how victims and perpetrators had 
to learn how to live next door to each other. In this sense, Del Pino speaks 
of a “restoring and integrating silence,” a kind of communal compromise 
that allowed for the (re)construction and growth of social structures in an 
environment where obligations toward the collective are situated above 
individual needs.54 However, there is a difference between silence as a 
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decision—individual or collective—and silence as an imposition, which 
may have the opposite effect.55 In politically pluralistic contexts such as 
Peru, imposed silences invite political elites to use memory as a tool—or 
as Victor Igreja says, a “weapon”—to influence political disputes.56 This 
observation is not dissimilar from what can be currently witnessed in 
European countries coping with the newly awoken “threat of terrorism” 
and a political shift to the right.
Ana and Cristina have been at once subjects and agents of discursive 
appropriations in post-conflict narratives. Ana has changed her claim from 
that of a revolutionary freedom fighter to a victim hoping for a release 
from prison. Cristina has silenced the stories of the deaths of two of her 
children in order to uphold the claim for truth and justice for the death 
of a third child, her innocent son. Both stories suggest that (experiential) 
truths and claims for justice can be mutually obstructive and hinder the 
potential polyphony in understanding the past. Now, we arrive once 
more at the initial question: what does it mean to cope with memories 
of a violent past and how can memory contribute to a depolarization of 
a seemingly perpetual conflict between narratives that are informed by 
politically motivated agendas? Are possible solutions closer to simplifica-
tions or complications of that past?
While I have found that dichotomies such as victim/perpetrator, 
justice/injustice and guilt/innocence may be analytically misleading, they 
are still important to those who make use of them in order to exist in a 
world-after-war. These terms accomplish an important task in that they 
create a certain order amidst the chaos of disrupted lives. “Life after the 
war only regains meaning once you return to understand what is good 
and bad, ugly and beautiful, the reasons for which you live and for which 
you hate,” said Cristina’s youngest daughter who has fought alongside her 
mother as long as she can remember, as she described the importance of 
these dichotomies. This only affirms that people need to position them-
selves in relation to “others,” but the problem is not the production of 
opposing perspectives, as Ernst Becker suggests in his book The Denial 
of Death, but to include them in a larger theoretical structure.57 In this 
sense, anthropology may help to identify and analyze senses of justice 
and morality, by complicating supposedly fixed meanings. Closing with 
Sundar’s suggestion that, rather than supporting the “owners of moral 
norms” who often purport to act in the name of universal values, the aim 
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should be to analyze how guilt is constructed in everyday life.58 My own 
analysis of guilt has led me to the limits of storytelling and the silences 
that polarized discourses provoke. Creating more nuanced images of 
actors in former conflicts scrutinizes simplistic dichotomies of good and 
evil, while—and this is vital—avoiding any relativization or legitimization 
of the crimes committed. But without identifying the nuances that blur 
established boundaries, we run the risk of creating new myths.
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